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Why the Outlaw Won the War: 
How Civil War Foreign Diplomacy Pivoted Around an Illegal Blockade 
Three's Company, Too 
Although most people only remember two, there were three main players in the 
American Civil War: the North, the South, and the specter of Great Britain. For the 
duration of the war, Great Britain, the world's strongest naval power, was officially 
neutral, but everyone at that time knew that, had she chosen to enter the fray, she (and the 
intimidating European alliance that would have followed in her wake) would have held 
keys to victory. 1 
As a result, both the Union's and the Confederacy's war strategies pivoted around 
obtaining Britain's diplomatic favor. Although many factors affected Britain's 
willingness to intervene and the Northern ability to win, this paper will focus on the 
effects of the Northern blockade. The Union had constructed a rickety blockade that she 
hoped to keep intact. Ineffective though it was, the Confederacy longed for its demise. As 
a result, both powers petitioned the British. The South pled for two tightly interwoven 
demands: diplomatic recognition and a blockade broken by British forces. The Union had 
a simpler but more rigorous request: that the British keep out of the conflict altogether. 
After all, the Union leaders clearly understood that any outside intervention could signal 
their doom. 2 
Great Britain understood that as well. They realized that lending the Confederacy 
even limited aid could tip the balance in Southern favor, splitting the Union in two. Many 
1 Norman A. Graebner, "Northern Diplomacy and European Neutrality," Why the North Won the 
Civil War, edited by David Donald (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), 49. 
2 Brian Jenkins. Britain and the War for the Union (Montreal: MeGill-Queen's University Press, 
1974), 1:39. 
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Britons longed to watch the great democratic experiment bite the dust. 3 In addition to 
demonstrating the supremacy of the system of constitutional monarchy and vindicating 
the British defeat in the Revolutionary War, such a collapse would free up the remainder 
of the North American continent to be claimed by European (preferably British) powers. 
At the same time, however, the British realized that remaining unentangled in the 
conflict could also bear fruit. Having just extracted themselves from the Crimean War, 
they were not eager to squander their thriving economy and vast resources on another 
conflict, however small it might be. They realized that there were plenty of economic 
advantages available to them as neutrals. 4 Besides, although the British needed Southern 
cotton to meet their manufacturing needs, they realized that the North could offer them 
something that would be equally valuable in the long run: a new naval precedent. 5 
When the Crimean War of the 1850s had concluded, the British had lost more 
than their will to fight; they had also lost their naval edge. The Declaration of Paris, 
which had officially closed the conflict, had also pick-pocketed Great Britain's greatest 
naval asset: the blockade. Although the Declaration didn't outlaw blockading altogether, 
it made the requirements for a legal blockade so rigorous that it might as well have. 6 This 
rancid memory made the British think twice before unraveling the frayed Northern 
3 Graebner, 50. 
4 James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989), 383. 
5 Baxter, James P., III, "The British Government and Neutral Rights, 1861-1865," The American 
Historical Review 34.1 (Oct 1928): 13, 
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=00028762%2819281 0%2934%3A I %3 C9%3A TBGANR %3E2.0.C0%3B2-F 
(accessed Nov 22, 2006). 
6 Ephraim Douglass Adams, Great Britain and the American Civil War (New York: Russell & 
Russell, 1958), 1:140. 
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blockade. After all, if the inadequate Northern blockade was honored, subsequent British 
blockades could escape the Declaration's exacting standards as well.7 
As a result, the British decision of whether or not to intervene during the Civil 
War's first two years hinged not on the battlefield but on the seas. The South spent those 
years trying to convince Britain that the Northern blockade was illegal. The North spent 
them trying to make her blockade legal by shoring it up. In the meantime, the North made 
plain her opinion that the acts of breaking the blockade and recognizing the Confederacy 
were inextricably intertwined and that either one would be interpreted as a tacit 
declaration of war. 8 
Most countries that gain advantages in wars achieve them through military and 
naval prowess; the Union, by contrast, gained hers through her shortcomings. Although 
elementary school textbooks might paint the Union victorious after the surrender at 
Appotomax, the North scored an ironic and equally important victory when her good-for-
nothing 1861 to 1862 blockade played a large part in convincing the British to do what 
Northerners wanted them to do the most: to keep out. 
How Others Have Seen This Same Blockade 
I am not the first author to chronicle the impact of the North's blockade during the 
Civil War. In reading the short historiographical section of the multi-authored work, Why 
the South Lost the War, one is almost overawed by the abundance of historians who have 
7 Raimondo Luraghi, A History of the Confederate Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 
70-71. McPherson, 385. 
Peter J. Parish, The American Civil War, (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1975), 
407-408. 
Frank J. Merli, Great Britain and the Confederate Navy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1965), 22-23. 
8 "Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams," Correspondence Relative to the Case of Messrs. Mason and Slidell, 
30 Nov 1861, Washington, 1. Adams, I: 270-271. 
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focused on the blockade.9 That book's authors depict blockade historiography as having 
come in three phases. 
The first wave of blockade historians, which included Merton Coulter, Bern 
Anderson, Charles P. Roland, and James R. Soley, traced the blockade's evolution from 
inadequate to airtight, arguing that the blockade's efficacy was a major factor in the 
South's defeat. The second wave of historians, which included FrankL. Owsley, Marcus 
W. Price, and Richard E. Wood, balked at their predecessors' interpretations, insisting 
that the blockade was never effective and was ultimately a failure. After them, a third 
wave followed with a different focus: the Confederacy's response to the blockade. These 
historians, which included Richard Lester and Richard Goff, claimed that the 
Confederacy did not make responding to the blockade a top priority and implied that, if 
she had, she could have won the war. 
For my studies, I decided to zero in on a cross-section of these three approaches, 
focusing on the notably inefficient first two years of the blockade. In addition, I decided 
to investigate how the blockade's incompetence shaped Northern and Southern 
interactions with Great Britain. I found many helpful interpretations of this situation 
tucked away in chapters devoted to the blockade in comprehensive Civil War histories. 
Especially helpful were James McPherson's Battle Cry of Freedom, editor David 
McDonald's Why the North Won the War, Peter J. Parish's The American Civil War, and 
the multi-authored work, Why the South Lost the War. Volumes of this sort interpreted 
the blockade (once it became effective) as one of many factors contributing to the 
Northern victory. 
9 Richard E. Beringer, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William N. Still, Jr, Why the South 
Lost the Civil War, (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1986). 
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When I needed more detail on interactions with the British, I turned to classics 
such as Brian Jenkins's Britain and the War for the Union, Ephraim Adams's Great 
Britain and the American Civil War, Howard Jones's The Union, the Confederacy, and 
the Atlantic Rim, James Callahan's Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy, and 
D.P. Crook's The North, the South, and the Powers. These histories provided blow-by-
blow accounts of international diplomacy from which I was able to glean a more 
complete understanding of gradual trends. 
In the end, I stirred together conclusions from all of these sources to enhance my 
understanding of a topic of which I had seen nothing in print: how the sheer inefficacy of 
the Northern blockade from 1861 to 1862 played a large role in keeping the British from 
intervening on the Confederacy's behalf. This happenstance was incredibly ironic 
because, had the early Northern efforts created a blockade effective enough to meet the 
standards of the Declaration of Paris, the blockade probably couldn't have achieved the 
comparable diplomatic results. 
Blockade My Foot 
One would expect that a blockade worthy of receiving so much diplomatic 
attention must have been absolutely crippling to the British economy; ironically, its real 
state couldn't have been farther from the truth. On average during the war, five out of six 
vessels that attempted to run the blockade made it through (in 1861, nine out of ten made 
it out with no problem). These blockade runners made sure that Southern ports stayed 
busy, hauling out half a million bales of cotton in exchange for two million shoes, half a 
Ford6 
million rifles, a thousand tons of gunpowder, and a mind-boggling amount of other war 
supplies. 10 
Although some enthusiasts like Commander S.F. Dupont thrilled at the thought of 
the blockade's establishment, hoping it would "squeeze the South more than anything," 
few were surprised by the blockade's inefficacy. 11 From the moment Lincoln announced 
the blockade, the British raised their eyebrows, doubtful that blockading such an 
enormous area was truly practical for the Union navy. 12 Since the British had blockaded 
the Eastern coast during the American Revolution, they knew exactly how challenging 
such a chore could be. The area to be enclosed was enormous: 35,549 miles of coastline 
laced with numerous tiny inlets and parallel streams. The British had been unable to 
effectively accomplish the feat with their 800 vessels; it was no wonder they laughed 
when the North approached the chore with only forty. 13 Jefferson Davis heckled the 
scanty Union effort, remarking that the Union's navy was "insufficient to blockade 
effectively the coast of a single State," much less the entire southern shore. 14 
Launching a weak blockade that then was gradually fortified was not unheard of; 
in fact, that was the strategy employed traditionally by the British, one that had brought 
them great success and created great resentment in those whom it victimized. After the 
British blockade of the Crimean War, Britain's enemies agitated strongly for a treaty that 
would prohibit such "paper blockades." 'They defined a paper blockade as an instance in 
10 McPherson, 388. 
11 S.F. Dupont, Civil War Letters: Volume 1: The Mission, edited by John Hayes 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), 67, 76. Although there is some dispute about a blockade ofthe 
entire coastline or only several ports of entry was essential to obtain the blockaders' objectives, there is 
little disagreement over the fact that the Northern blockade was very weak during the war's first two years. 
12 Adams, 246. 
13 "The Departments: The Report of the Secretary of the Navy," The New York Times 8 Dec 1864, 
Proquest, via McKee Library, http://library.southern.edu (accessed September 28, 2006). 
14 Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government (New York: Sagamore Press, 
1958), 2:373. 
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which a country claimed that its ships formed an impermeable barrier that halted all 
international commerce but in actuality accomplished little, allowing foreign ships to slip 
through freely and continue trade. In 1856, the British had reluctantly accepted the new 
stipulations for an effective blockade when they signed the Declaration of Paris along 
with every other "civilized nation" except for the United States. 15 In the Declaration, the 
British agreed that from there on out, "blockades, in order to be binding, must be 
effective ... maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the 
enemy."16 
Some sections of the Declaration were feared by Southerners who worried that 
they might damage Confederate commerce. 17 The portion about paper blockades, 
however, they embraced entirely, making it the fulcrum of their foreign policy. They 
were thrilled because that proclamation, originally intended by the European nations to 
be wielded against Britain, could now be used against the North. Although Lincoln had 
vowed that a "competent force [would] be posted so as to prevent entrance and exit of 
15 The United States was engaged in the Declaration's negotiations and in fact proposed her own 
amendment, but when it took too long for her amendment to be tacked on, she lost interest in the document. 
16 Adams, 1: 140. 
17 Jenkins, 41-42. Adams, 150, 201. One of the reasons that the United States had refused to sign 
the Declaration of Paris was because they clung to their right as a neutral to engage in privateering, i.e. 
armed robbery of belligerent ships. In prior conflicts, this privilege had been invaluable since the United 
States had been the weaker naval power. Privateering was one of the only ways that underdogs could gain 
an advantage. 
When the Civil War began, however, the tables turned. Suddenly the South was the weaker power 
and the one using privateering as a form of exploitation. As a result, the Union was filled with remorse for 
not having signed the Declaration of Paris. They hoped that if they signed the document to abolish 
privateering, it would cause the other European powers to look down on the Confederacy as more primitive 
because she still privateered. The Union hoped that the European powers would not bestow recognition on 
a primitive country. 
More than that, the North hoped that, after the Union signed the Declaration, the European nations 
would intervene with their navies to prevent the South from privateering and defying the Declaration. This 
Union wish, however, never came true. The foreign powers saw through her scheme, and she was never 
permitted to sign the Declaration. 
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vessels from the ports," it was common knowledge during the first two years of the war 
that the rickety blockade was not in full working order. 18 
In fact, according to Jefferson Davis (and numerous other irate Southerners), the 
Union's "announcement of a mere paper blockade" suspiciously resembled the 
inadequate British blockades of old. 19 The Confederate states were certain that they were 
not the only ones who saw the parallel, and they very verbally cherished the hope that 
Britain, dead-set on enforcing the Declaration, would declare the Northern blockade 
illegal, puncture it with their ships, and send it to the bottom of the sea. 20 
Plus, the South found another source of hope in the doubletalk used by the North. 
The North claimed that it could declare the Confederacy a rebellion while blockading her 
coast at the same time. This assertion, however, was a diplomatic paradox? After all, 
international law declared that nations never blockaded their own territory, only that of an 
independent foe. Claiming to blockade the Confederacy was as good as declaring her 
independent. If the Confederacy was only rebelling, then the North should have instead 
declared Southern ports closed. 
William Seward, Lincoln's Secretary of War, was painfully aware ofthis 
contradiction, but he was even more aware that Great Britain would disregard a simple 
declaration that the Southern ports were closed, especially if the Southern states were 
18 Abraham Lincoln, "Proclamation Declaring a Blockade of the South's Ports," Essential 
Documents in American History: 1492-present, Academic Search Premier, via McKee Library 
http://library.southem.edu (accessed August 31, 2006). 
19 Davis, Jefferson, "War Message," The Annals of America: 1858-1865, The Crisis of the Union 
(Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc, 1968), 9: 268. 
__ ,The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, 2: 373-374. 
20 Mary Boykin Chesnut, A Diary From Dixie, edited by Ben Ames Williams, (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1949), 92. McPherson, 383. Ironically, both the North and the South cherished hopes of 
foreign intervention on behalf of preserving the honor of different aspects of the Declaration. No such 
interference, however, ever came through. 
21 Ibid, 388. 
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able to keep on trading as if nothing was wrong. In Seward's eyes, using inconsistent 
terminology that was controversial was a wiser move than being technically correct and 
completely ignored. 22 Seward's verbal paradox irked the Confederate leaders, but there 
wasn't much they could do about it beyond crossing their fingers that such diplomatic 
impertinence would trigger European intervention. All of this drama snowballed around 
an obsession with the fact that the Union blockade was fundamentally ineffective. 
Belliger-whats? 
The British leaders were not pleased with the situation into which they had been 
thrust. From the beginning, a blockade had been their worst nightmare. "Above all things, 
endeavor to prevent a blockade of the Southern coast," Lord John Russell, the British 
Foreign Secretary, had implored the prime minister in February of 1861. "It would 
produce misery, discord and enmity incalculable."23 Beyond that, the issue was a hassle 
because it forced Great Britain to take sides. If she declared that the South was in 
rebellion, then she was giving her blessing to the Northern effort. If she declared the 
Northern blockade illegitimate, then she was bestowing her favor upon the South. Great 
Britain understood that, if she explicitly endorsed any aspect of either side's agenda, 
neutrality would become nearly impossible? Although at other points in history she 
might have welcomed such an opportunity, at this moment that prospect was particularly 
displeasing. Because Great Britain had just wrapped up one nasty conflict, the Crimean 
War, she was not chomping at the bit to entering another. 
22 Parish, 407. Merli, 40. Later Seward discovered that his instinctual belief that the British would 
refuse to honor such a declaration had been on target. When Seward mentioned in passing to Lord Lyons, 
the British Ambassador to Washington, that the North was pondering declaring Southern ports closed, 
Lyons responded immediately that England would consider such a declaration "null and void." 
23 Europe Looks at the Civil War, edited by Belle Becker Sideman and Lillian Friedman (New 
York: The Orion Press, 1960), 19. 
24 "Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams," 1. 
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Even so, Great Britain had to come to terms with the Northern blockade 
somehow. For the British, common sense insisted that the Confederate upheaval, with its 
population approaching nine million, its 750,000 miles of terrain, its well-orchestrated 
army, and its coherent constitution was far too advanced to be considered a rebellion? 
As Lord Russell pointed out, one doesn't recruit 400,000 soldiers and cough up 
$400,000,000 to extinguish a riot.26 
A desire to safeguarde Great Britain's honor also played a part. As the war rolled 
on, numerous Confederate complaints regarding Northern conduct on the seas insisted 
that through innumerable violations of the Declaration of Paris, the Union was 
"claim[ing] a general jurisdiction over the high seas" that truly belonged to England.27 
Whether or not the North was really making this claim, such Southern accusations ruffled 
many a British feather. More importantly, the British understood that eventually they 
would have to obtain more Southern cotton for their manufacturing sector, and they knew 
that cotton could only be obtained by going through the blockade? 
To deal with these issues, Southern diplomat William Yancey set sail for England. 
Although his pro-slavery and slave trade tendencies handicapped his diplomatic influence 
in anti-slavery Britain, he had one strong advantage over the Union representative: 
Yancey arrived first. And he took advantage of his early arrival to press for diplomatic 
recognition and to protest fervently the blockade's illegitimacy. Whether it was because 
of Yancey's eloquence, because of deep-seated British convictions, or because of a non-
25 McPherson, 388. 
26 John Evans, Atlantic Impact (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1952), 138. 
27 "The Civil War in America," Illustrated London News 39, no 1121 (14 Dec. 1861): 593, 
http://beck.library.emory.edu (accessed October 27, 2006). 
Frank Lawrence Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), 
221-2. 
28 "Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams," 1. 
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confrontational desire to come to some conclusion without having to engage in Northern 
negotiations, the British hastily announced their position on the day before the Northern 
diplomat arrived? Their two-step verdict of neutrality partially pleased and partially 
peeved both sides. 
First of all, although the British did not fully recognize the Confederacy or offer 
her aid, England did award the South makeshift belligerent status, which everyone 
assumed was an indisputable segway to formal diplomatic recognition.30 After all, 
"intercourse of any kind with the so-called Commissioners [would be] liable to be 
construed as a recognition ofthe authority which appointed them."31 Although the Union 
found this belligerent recognition annoying, it did not come as a huge surprise because 
British and Confederate cotton interests were so closely intertwined.32 
Instead, it was the second part of the British declaration that astonished both the 
North and the South, when in spite of Yancey's insistence that the blockade was 
practically invisible, the British declared it fully legal instead.33 The North hailed the 
news with exultation, the South with outrage and alarm. 34 From that moment on, 
protestations of the blockade's obvious illegality would become the number one 
complaint that tattletaling Southern diplomats carried to Great Britain, a matter which 
was to the Confederacy comparable in importance only to securing diplomatic 
recognition. As a result, Confederate-British relations from 1861 to 1862 pivoted 
thereafter around a watery hinge: the absurdity of the Northern blockade. 
29 McPherson, 387-388. 
30 Graebner, 55. Parish, 497. 
31 Abraham Lincoln, "21 May 1861," University of Michigan Digital Library Texts, Collected 
Texts of Abraham Lincoln (accessed November 3, 2006). 
32 Merli, 43. 
33 Adams, 1: 245-246. 
34 Parish, 407. 
Ford 12 
The Forcotton Confederacy Snaps to Inaction 
From the first cannon's firing, the Confederacy had built its response to the 
Northern blockade around an unspoken asswnption that it would receive British 
recognition and aid.35 One word convinced the South that Southern and British interests 
were incalculably intertwined: cotton. 'Throughout the first half ofthe nineteenth century, 
cotton had been Britain's most important import and the South's most important export. 
The Southern States had provided on average 77.5% of Britain's cotton needs; and in 
1860, the last year before the war began, the South had stocked over 80% of Britain's 
fluffy arsenal. 36 
Wide-spread awareness of these statistics inflated Southern confidence in their 
ability to win the war. As a result, Confederate Vice-President Alexander Stephans could 
not imagine that the blockade would stay around for long. "Our cotton is ... the 
tremendous lever by which we can work our destiny," he explained. "In some way or 
other [the blockade will] be raised or there will be revolution in Europe." But Stephans, 
along with most Southerners, did not plan on being actively engaged in breaking the 
blockade; instead, Southerners hoped that English dependence on Southern cotton would 
force the British to shatter the blockade while the Confederacy looked on.37 One 
Charleston merchant's comment to the London Times shortly after the war broke out 
succinctly swnmed up Southern expectations. "If those miserable Yankees try to 
35 Chesnut, 73, 92, 247, 347, 445. 
36 Pelzer, John D. "Liverpool and the American Civil War." History Today 40, no. 3 (Mar90): 46-
52. Academic Search Premier, via McKee Library http://library.southem.edu (accessed August 30, 2006). 
37 "Lyons to Russell, Dispatch 719," Nov. 29, 1861, British Eyes, 1: 234. 
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) blockade us, and keep you from our cotton, you'll just send them to the bottom and 
acknowledge us," he said. "That will be before autumn, I think."38 
One result of this overconfident assumption was a scandalous neglect of the 
Southern naval program. Because the South expected to elicit British support by 
impressing them with Confederate military prowess, the Southern Cabinet funneled most 
of its resources into terrestrial army operations instead of funding naval interests.39 For 
most Confederates (at least within the first two years of the war), the blockade was 
inefficient, irrelevant, and easy to ignore. 40 Stephen Mallory, the Confederate Secretary 
of the Navy, was one of the few who saw it as a latent threat, a cobra slowly but surely 
encircling the Confederate regime. Although everyone in the Southern Cabinet believed 
that the blockade must be broken in order to win the war, Mallory was the only one who 
believed that the South must play an active role in destroying it; the rest longed to leave 
the matter in able British hands.41 
Although Mallory did his best to persuade his colleagues to respond to the 
blockade by constructing a Confederate navy, the plan seemed too daunting and was not 
given top priority. After all, the Confederates had begun the war with no ships, no 
seamen, and no suitable naval yards. Although the Confederates had a brief love affair 
with British-produced ironclads, this fling was too short-lived to produce long-term 
results. 42 As a result, two years into the war, well-known Southern oceanographer 
38 William Howard Russell, My Diary, North and South (New York: Harper Brothers, 1954), 69. 
39 Joseph P. Durkin, Confederate Navy Chief Stephen P. Mallory (Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1954), 364. 
40 Owsley, 253-262. 
41 Durkin, 364. 
42 Burton J. Hendrick, Statesmen of a Lost Cause: Jefferson Davis and His Cabinet (New York: 
The Literary Guild of America, Inc., 1939), 374. Owsley, 394-426. 
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Matthew Maury could still observe that it was "evidently no part of the plan of the 
[Southern] Administration to have a navy at present or to even encourage one. "43 
Rather than formulating a ????????????????naval response, the South opted for a 
more practical and less taxing option: an embargo. The Confederates believed that the 
British suffering that would be inflicted by a cotton embargo would be enough to rouse 
the British from their neutral stupor and actuate them to break the blockade. Hoping to 
t 
secure both revenge and acknowledgement with one stealthy blow, the South decided to 
hold back their cotton and let the British enjoy what they insisted existed: an effective 
blockade. 44 
In order to accomplish this feat, an incredibly ??????????????grassroots Southern 
embargo was launched. Many Congressional endorsements of the embargo were 
proposed, but none of them ever passed, leaving the orchestration of the movement 
largely in its citizens' capable hands. Local newspapers encouraged their people to "keep 
every bale of cotton on the plantation ... [not] send[ing] a thread to New Orleans or 
Memphis til England and France have recognized the Confederacy-not one thread. "45 
Patriotic farmers obeyed, taking a fmancial hit in the name of succession.46 
The numbers resulting from the embargo were impressive; during its first (and 
only) year, the amount of Southern cotton exported to Europe was 1% of what it had been 
before.47 Unfortunately for its Southern adherents, the embargo's effects on the British 
were nowhere near what the South had hoped for. The Confederacy had assumed that the 
43 Ibid, 364. 
44 McPherson, 384-385. 
45 Ibid, 3 83. 
46 Graebner, 59. Those who did not share the enthusiasm were also forced to partake in the 
embargo by self-appointed "Committees of Public Safety" who worked to impose a level of vigilante unity. 
47 Parish, 398. In late 1862, the embargo gradually lost steam as that strategy was abandoned and a 
new one of using cotton to buy war materials was adopted in its stead. Unfortunately, by this time, the 
blockade was tightening, and it was becoming increasingly difficult to ship cotton overseas. 
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British manufacturing industry was one-pronged like the South's own one-crop economy, 
which revolved almost entirely around cotton exports. This assumption, however, was 
untrue; although cotton manufactures had commandeered the British economy in the past, 
for some time now its importance had been receding.48 
The Confederate states' calculations had pictured their embargo's causing 
"England [to] topple headlong and carry the whole civilized world with her, save the 
South."49 Instead, the British continued to thrive, and it was the Southern cotton farmers 
who found themselves financially floundering. 50 Other unforeseen and unsavory 
Confederate quandaries also resulted from the embargo. For example, since the Southern 
farmers were riddled with debt, many were not able to supply themselves with war arms. 
Worst of all, the Confederacy was robbed of her cotton market as British leaders began to 
brainstorm other destinations from which cotton could be imported. 
Ironically, what led to the embargo's defeat was what had from the start most 
infused Southerners with confidence: their faith in Britain's reliance on Confederate 
cotton supplies. Strangely enough, the Southern mistake was not that they had 
overestimated their importance to the British manufacturing industry from 1857 to 1860. 
48 McPherson, 386. In addition to their belief that the conflict would end soon, the British 
understood that the Civil War was continuing to rework the composition of their economy, decreasing 
cotton's overall importance and increasing the significance of other industries such as ship-building and 
munitions exports. In that way, the cheers in Liverpool, Britain's most prominent ship-building district, 
drowned out the moans of Lancashire, a manufacturing district that relied heavily on cotton. 
49 McPherson, 383. 
so "France and the American Blockade: Attempts to Procure Recognition of the Rebel 
Government." The New York Times 26 Oct 1861. Proquest, via McKee Library http://library.southern.edu 
(accessed September 28, 2006). Parish, 408. Europe Looks, 211. "Lyons to Russell, Dispatch 585," Oct. 
21, 1861, British Eyes, I : 186. Had the British economy been less stable, the Southern embargo might have 
succeeded. In France, which was also under the embargo's decree, vast suffering was experienced when its 
manufacturing districts were "prostrated by the civil war" as a result of the airtight Southern embargo. The 
districts in question "[urged] for an immediate recognition of the Confederate States and the raising of the 
blockade," and for a time many people "expressed a confident belief that the Emperor of the French 
[contemplated] recognizing the Confederate States of the South." Unfortunately, for the Confederacy, the 
French were unwilling to intervene alone. Ironically, historians believe that the Confederacy stopped 
conducting its embargo right around the time it would have become effective in England. 
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On the contrary, the sad reality was that they had done their job too well. They had 
overexported, creating a cotton surplus in Britain that would tide the British 
manufacturers over until Southern zeal for the embargo was largely extinguished. As a 
result, instead of plunging the British cotton-manufacturing industry into a depression, 
historians believe that the Southern embargo actually aided the industry, aborting a 
recession that would have occurred as a result of the overload. 51 
Diplomatically, the embargo also ate away at the likelihood of Southern success. 
Even though the Southern government never claimed responsibility for the embargo, 
preferring to depict itself to the foreign powers as the hapless victim of a popular 
movement, the British understood that the government offered the embargo its tacit 
support. As a result, they were disinclined to ally with the South, annoyed that the 
Confederacy had tried to coerce them into friendship. "I wonder that the South do not see 
that our recognition because they keep cotton from us would be ignominious beyond 
measure, & that no English Parlt could do so base a thing," one English leader exclaimed. 
The sentiments of thousands of irate British citizens echoed that opinion, and their view 
ofthe North's paper blockade was enhanced because of British annoyance with the 
Southern embargo. 52 
Stacking the Deck: 
Why the British Smiled Upon the Northern Blockade 
The belief that cotton was king was not confined to the South. William Seward, 
whose attitude was characteristic of the average Northerner's, also feared that the British 
51 McPherson, 385-6. 
52 Graebner, 60. McPherson, 384-5. 
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would try to "save cotton at the cost of the Union."53 His worries were not unfounded; 
they were spurred along by many British remarks that seemed to betoken cotton-driven 
diplomacy. "We do not like slavery," remarked Prime Minister Henry Palmerston, "but 
we want cotton, and we dislike very much your Morrill tariff. "54 
Both the North and the South believed that other factors also presaged British 
interference in favor of the Confederacy. For example, although the British had long-
since accepted the fact that the United States was no longer a colony, obvious anti-
democratic sentiment lingered on. 
It is precisely because we do not share the admiration of America for her 
own institutions and political tendencies that we do not now see in the 
impending change [that is, the collapse of the Union] an event altogether 
to be deplored. 
wrote Blackwood's magazine in 1861.55 A crumpled Union offered another enticement, a 
promise that the North American continent would once again be fair game, no longer 
held captive by the American cult of Manifest Destiny and the Monroe Doctrine. 56 
And then of course there was the motivation of revenge. In both the Napoleonic 
and the Crimean Wars, the Americans had defied ineffective British blockades, 
denouncing them as permeable and therefore illegitimate. The opportunity to intervene in 
the Civil War now appeared to be the picture-perfect occasion for the British to return the 
53 Merli, 43. 
54 Ibid, 22. Such a tarriff's passage had long been agitated for by the North and long spurned by 
the South. The succession of the Southern states and the subsequent removal of their representatives from 
Congress made such a passage possible. However, the fact that it was now possible did not necessarily 
mean that it was now wise. After all, it hurt the British just as the Civil War broke out, the worst possible 
time to irk such a strong power and potential enemy. 
55 Graebner, 50. 
56 The Monroe Doctrine was an American declaration by President James Monroe in 1823 that 
championed European nonintervention and noncolonization in the Americas. Although it was initially the 
subject of great derision because the United States was too weak to actually enforce it, European respect 
(and resentment) for the declaration gradually snowballed. The topic was of especial interest to England's 
French allies during the Civil War because they were attempting to annex Mexico and did not desire 
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favor, using the Declaration of Paris's new definition of what constituted a paper 
blockade as an excuse to bash the Northern war effort to pieces. 57 
But even though all of these factors caused the British to await the Union's 
division with "an impatience which it [had] difficulty disguising," two main lines of 
reasoning led the British to declare themselves neutral. First of all, they were certain that 
the South would triumph by default since the British did not "see how the United States 
[could] be cobbled together again by any compromise. "58 Under the impression that the 
war would end quickly with the outcome that they desired, the British did not see any 
motivation to enter into an unnecessary and possibly messy intervention. 59 If for some 
reason the South was unable to win the war easily, the British did not want to be stuck 
with the bloody tab. This aversion forced them to place any thoughts of intervention on 
hold until the South demonstrated indisputably that it could attain victory on its own. 60 
Secondly, and more importantly, the British thoroughly comprehended the long-
term consequences of violating the Northern blockade. Although shutting down Union 
pretensions using the Declaration of Paris might be exhilarating for a moment, the British 
knew that such a move would be a Pyrrhic victory. "A blockade is by far the most 
formidable weapon of offence we possess," noted the London Times. "Surely we ought 
not to be over-ready to blunt its edge or injure its temper?"61 
After all, meeting the requirements for a true blockade according to the 
Declaration was prohibitively difficult, and the British understood that whatever standard 
s? McPherson, 382-383. 
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they applied to other nations could eventually be retorted against herself." 62 It seemed 
absurd that a power that was so self-aware would even consider "tak[ing] a step ... that 
may hereafter be quoted against herself, and may make it impossible for her, with honour 
or consistency, to avail herself of her superiority at sea."63 
As a result of these considerations, when Lord Russell set to drafting a British 
declaration of which characteristics must be in place in order for Britain to regard the 
Northern blockade as legitimate, he did so strategically. His definition was nowhere near 
the rigorous Declaration of Paris's. Instead, it was lenient, remarking significantly that 
the fact that ''various ships may have successfully escaped through [the blockade] ... 
[would] not of itself prevent the blockade from being an effective one by international 
law."64 All things considered, the indirect approval of Great Britain gave the rickety 
Union blockade the nod. 
Building Blockades, Building Relationships 
Great Britain's acknowledgement of the blockade, however, would by no means 
remain uncontested. From the beginning, the Confederacy was outraged by what they 
saw as incomplete neutrality, the policy of a nation that was "clearly [trying] to reopen to 
the prejudice of the Confederacy one of the very disputed questions on the law of the 
blockade which the Congress of Paris proposed to settle."65 To combat these injustices on 
the seas, they decided to send a Southern ambassador to Britain. 
The man they selected was William Yancey. Yancey had not sought out his 
foreign post; in fact, at first he had declined the offer. But Jefferson Davis insisted, 
62 Luraghi, 70-71. Parish, 407-408. McPherson, 385. Merli, 22-23. Baxter, 13. 
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demanding that Yancey either take a Cabinet position or become head of the commission 
to Europe. After much deliberation and ignored advice, Yancey chose the latter.66 
Although the Confederacy knew what she wanted to accomplish diplomatically, 
at first she had no clear conception of how to achieve it. According to the Confederate 
constitution, only the president could instruct Yancey on his diplomatic duties.67 
Although they could not present it themselves, the Committee on Foreign Relations 
composed a foreign policy directive containing instructions that they hoped Davis would 
explain to Yancey. Unfortunately, Davis never got around to it, leaving Yancey entirely 
without direction. 68 
Prior to Yancey's departure, one of his colleagues asked him how he how to 
planned on negotiating with the British. His reply was fluff, only generalizations about 
the importance of cotton. "Sir," his colleague exclaimed after hearing his response, "you 
have no business in Europe. You carry no argument which Europe cares to hear ... My 
counsel to you as a friend is, if you value your reputation, to stay at home. "69 
But by this counsel Yancey would not abide. Uninstructed, he sailed for Europe. 
Once he arrived, since he had no formal authorization for what he could lay out in 
negotiations, he soon became restless and discontent, feeling like less a diplomat and 
more like a blockade statistics billboard. Worst of all, because the communications he 
received from home base were erratic, infrequent, and insufficient, even the statistics he 
touted were inadequate. "Not a day passes that fails to bring demands upon us ... [for] 
information concerning the inefficiency of the blockade," he wrote home irritably. 
66John Witherspoon Dubose, The Life and Times of William Lowndes Yancey (New York: Peter 
Smith, 1942), 2: 588. 
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"Unfortunately we have been compelled to meet all such inquiries with the reply that 'we 
hope to be able to answer them by the next advices. "'70 
Yancey's floppy blockade diplomacy made little impact overseas. Although he 
achieved British recognition of Southern belligerency, his accomplishments ended there. 
The limited scope of his negotiations led England to declare that she "could not 
acknowledge the Confederate States until the war or further negotiations more clearly 
determined their position.? The British were so entirely unimpressed by what Yancey 
had to offer that Charles Francis Adams, the Union minister to Britain, was able to 
convince the British authorities to no longer receive the Southern "pseudo-
commissioners" at all. 72 Yancey heard of that declaration through a painful route, reading 
of his diplomatic fate in public documents. He was outraged, determined to file a 
complaint because the British has declared that they had "no intention of seeing [the 
Confederate commissioners] again," but his colleagues held him back, convinced that it 
would exacerbate rather than remedy the situation. 73 
Verbally estranged from the officials whom he had crossed the Atlantic to 
encounter, Yancey and his fellow commissioners were forced to compose a letter to the 
British outlining what the South had to offer. Unfortunately, the only thing the letter 
could serve up was the usual: a steamy invitation for the British to break the blockade 
sauteed in barbed rhetoric about broken Declaration of Paris vows. After all, the 
Confederates pointed out (as usual), it was the responsibility of "the neutrals, whose 
70 Ibid, 608. 
71 "From Europe," The New York Times 24 Feb 1862, Proquest, via McKee Library 
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commerce is seriously damaged, to determine for how long a blockade, of such a 
character, [should] be respected."74 
Predictably, the letter confined the Confederacy's role to playing the damsel in 
distress until she received recognition. She claimed no responsibility for breaking the 
blockade; her sole duty would be resuming a lucrative cotton trade once the war was 
concluded. The English needed her, she insisted, and if they wished to survive, they 
would "consider the necessities of commercial relations with [the South and their 
importance] to the preservation of certain great interests in England."75 
After elegantly inking their allurements, the diplomats tagged onto their 
document's end an afterthought that if the British were not entirely persuaded to come to 
the Confederate Union's aid after reading this letter, "such an announcement [would] be 
received with surprise."76 But when the letter was ignored, Yancey was not astonished. 
Although his rhetoric in the letter had remained lofty, by late 1861 his hopes were not. 
Shortly after sending the diplomatic letter, he sent off yet another-his resignation.77 
The dead-end nature of Southern blockade diplomacy had morphed the diplomat's 
shining ideals into a tarnished admission of disillusionment. "Had I known the trouble 
and delay involved in this mission," he wrote home, "I should never have accepted [the 
position]."78 Although nearly all of Yancey's diplomatic efforts had aimed to sour the 
British opinion of the Northern blockade, Great Britain had her sights set on securing a 
new naval precedent, and as a result she was unmoved by Yancey's empty bids for her 
favor. Yancey had unearthed Britain's attitude the hard way and was sorely disappointed; 
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it was with great difficulty that he was persuaded to stay put until his successors' 
arrival.79 
Captive Controversy 
Although many Southerners were temporarily discouraged by the failure of 
Yancey's mission, their hopes were soon revived by a confidence in their new foreign 
commissioner to England, James Mason. Prior missions had been premature, Southerners 
reasoned-now the time was truly ripe. 80 After all, by late 1861, they believed that, not 
only were a stream of military victories speaking eloquently in their favor, but the 
economic impact of the embargo must be testifying on their behalf as well. Papers like 
the Morning Post were so optimistic that they proclaimed that Mason and his companion, 
John Slidell, the Confederate commissioner to France, had "achieved [Southern] 
independence" by simply setting sail. In reality, however, the two diplomats would 
probably not have achieved much more than Yancey had the Trent affair had not been 
brought to fruition by the permeability ofthe Union blockade. 81 
Although Mason and Slidell had made careful preparations for running the 
blockade, the one thing they did not do carefully was keep a secret. In fact, the specifics 
of their departure had been so trumpeted that the Union was able to increase the number 
of warships guarding the Charleston harbor from one to five before the Confederates' 
blockade runner departed. 82 But in spite of the beef-up barrier, Mason's crew slipped 
79 James Morton Callahan, Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy (New York: Frederick 
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effortlessly through and began their journey towards Nassau, where they planned to 
board the British steamer that would carry them across the Atlantic. 
If the Northern blockade had been unbreakable and had intercepted Mason's 
Britain-bound crew, England would have been annoyed, but the affair would probably 
have blown over. The blockade's permeability and the circumstances that this weakness 
bred, however, ensured that there would be no simple solutions. After running the 
blockade, Mason and his crew arrived in Nassau and eventually boarded the British mail 
steamer, the Trent. Soon afterwards they were intercepted by Captain John Wilkes, an 
overzealous naval officer without government authorization who was determined to 
terminate Mason's "diabolical scheme" and to avenge the blockade, which had been 
humiliated by the ease with which it had been run. 83 
Although Wilkes was trying to aid the Union cause, his actions gave the 
Confederacy their best chances of success yet. There were many routes of justifying what 
Wilkes had done by international law, but there was no way of justifying away the British 
wrath that he had incurred.84 Jefferson Davis captured the essence of British outrage 
when he exclaimed: 
These gentlemen were as much under the jurisdiction of the British 
Government upon that ship and beneath that flag as if they had been on its 
soil, and a claim on the part of the United States to seize them in the 
streets of London would have been as well founded as that to apprehend 
them where they were taken. 85 
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Slidell, Mason's companion, had also realized the magnitude of the opportunity being 
thrust into their laps. In fact, he was so eager to be seized and to have the British 
emotionally drawn into the war on the Southern side that when the British captain of the 
Trent refused to reveal to Wilkes whether or not Mason's party was onboard, Slidell 
stepped forward and voluntarily made known his presence. 86 
Because the Northerners were so busy rejoicing, it took them a while to process 
the diplomatic implications of Wilkes's rash actions. For the North, Wilkes's news was a 
life-preserver in a sea of military setbacks. Better yet, it piggybacked another piece of 
fantastic news that had arrived only three days before the announcement that the North 
had finally captured their first Southern cotton port. William Seward, the Union Secretary 
of War, had long hoped for this development, which he was sure "would materially 
change the views of the European powers." 87 For good-news starved Northerners, the 
two tidbits combined to spawn a "storm of exultation."88 
As a result, Wilkes received a promotion, the "emphatic approval of the [naval] 
department," congressional congratulations "for his brave, adroit and patriotic conduct in 
arresting and detaining the Mssrs. Mason and Slidell," and the common man's adulation 
to boot. 89 The New York Times hailed him as the "hero of the hour," Harper's Weekly 
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rhapsodized about his ''triumph[s]" and "glories," and Northern opinion ran hot in his 
favor, positive that his actions were justifiable by internationallaw.90 
"We will wrap the world in flames!" exclaimed William Seward, the Northern 
Secretary of War, in answer to an inquiry about how the Union would respond to a 
British declaration of war over the Trent affair. ''No power so remote that she will not 
feel the fire of our battle and be burned by our conflagration.'m But despite the sweeping 
implications of Seward's words, one guest at the party cautioned the correspondent for 
the London Times not to take Seward's emotions at face value. "That's all bugaboo talk," 
the guest confided. "When Seward talks that way, he means to break down. He is most 
dangerous and obstinate when he pretends to agree with you."92 
The guest was on target. Seward was posturing for good reason. After all, as the 
Confederate Secretary of War phrased it, "the press rules America ... no one can face it 
and live. ,,93 Seward did not at first understand the importance of presenting a 
disapproving Northern reaction to Wilkes's actions, what he did understand was that he 
could not swim against the rip tide of public opinion without being washed out to sea. As 
a result, for a time the Union government obliged the American people their desire by 
refusing to hand over the captive diplomats. This situation, like so many others, had been 
spawned by the incompetence of the Northern blockade. And so the North reacted and 
then sat tight, testing the waters for a British reaction. Very soon a definitive response 
arrived. 
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It took the beating of war drums to convince Union celebrations to subside. And 
this time the threat did not come form the South; it came from Canada, the route through 
which the British were planning to invade. The British did not share Northern 
appreciation for Wilkes's swashbuckling, seeing it not as an act of heroism but instead as 
"a wanton act of aggression."94 "The occurrence cannot but have a baleful effect on our 
future relations with this government," wrote home Foreign Minister Richard Lyons. 
After all, the American people were "pleased at having ... insulted the British flag." 
Even if Wilkes's action could be justified by international law, Lyons was determined 
that such impertinence should not be permitted to prevail. Then ''they would be 
confirmed in their idea that England will bear anything from them. "95 
The eruption of such a conflict instigated by the Northern blockade was precisely 
what the Confederacy had been hoping for, and she took this opportunity to revamp her 
foreign diplomatic policy accordingly. In the past, she had discovered that arriving 
promptly for vigilant negotiations had not gotten her very far; after all, Yancey had sped 
to Britain, arriving only 17 days after Fort Sumter had been fired upon, and his haste had 
accomplished little. Now, courtesy of the leaky Union blockade, Mason could experiment 
'th . . I 96 WI a new strategy: arri???g ate. 
While the British were wading through the conflict, Robert Bunch, the 
Confederate console in Charleston, Virginia, kept a steady stream of statistics disproving 
the blockade's adequacy flowing across the sea. "The blockade is the laughing stock of 
the Southern merchant marine," he wrote. "There is in reality no blockade at all of this 
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coast . . . Vessels of various sizes enter and sail almost at pleasure. "97 Bunch hoped that 
in the heat of the Trent controversy the frustrated British would fmally be more receptive 
to such information. 
For a while, the strategy seemed to be working. The New York Times 
correspondent in London sensed a drastic change in mood. "A Northern man in London 
is subject to many humiliations. Public opinion is against him," he lamented. "If there has 
been a disposition [in England] to overlook small matters connected with the blockade 
and neutral rights, it exists no longer."98 
But although the common Englishman might have been war-dancing in the street, 
the British leaders were more reticent. They understood, as they had from the start, that 
entering a foreign war was a major commitment, and as a result felt "distress[ed] and 
alarm[ed]" by the progression of events.99 If they had to, they were more than willing to 
"inflict a severe blow upon, and ... read a lesson to the United States which [would] not 
soon be forgotten." 100 But it was not their first choice, and they would gladly exchange 
the prospect of a bloody brawl for the Southern diplomats' "immediate delivery" and a 
Northern "apology for the aggression that had been committed."101 
In an effort to extort such results, the British launched a hardcore program of 
military fortification in Canada, realizing that the more intimidating the preparations for 
war in Canada were, ''the more likelihood [there was] that peace [could] yet be 
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preserved."102 As a result, "both the Imperial authorities [of Canada] and the people 
[began] preparing for the worst."103 The Confederate leaders licked their lips. Finally, it 
appeared that rickety blockade itself had forced the British into a situation where they 
could no longer quietly stand by. 
Seward Saves the Day 
At first it appeared that the Trent affair, which had been spawned by the leaky 
blockade's weaknesses, would be the North's destruction. In the end, however, the affair 
fostered more communication between the Union and Great Britain than it did dissent, 
increasing the foreign powers' trust in one another and lubricating the process of 
negotiations with goodwill. Because of the relationships that it built, the process required 
to dissipate the uproar over the Trent both righted the situation and-ironically-ensured 
the blockade's survival. 
Traditionally, British trust in the Northern Cabinet had been less than solid, 
especially in William Seward, the Northern Secretary of War. Early in 1861, the British 
minister to the Union had written home that he "[did] not implicitly rely on all Mr. 
Seward's assurances."104 Such a belief was not confined to his mind alone; the rest of the 
British Cabinet also regarded Seward with fear mainly because he came off as volatile, 
unpredictable, and war-mongering, the Kim 11 Jong ofthe nineteenth century. 105 
Outward appearances indicated that the British fears were well-founded. Seward 
frequently derided Britain, whom he saw as the "the greatest, the most grasping, and the 
most rapacious power in the world." He longed to kidnap her colonies and was very 
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outspoken in his belief that her removal was essential if the United States were to become 
a truly dominant power. 106 When the Civil War had first begun, Seward longed to reunite 
the North and the South in a common cause: a war against Europe. 107 Shortly into the 
Civil War, he surrendered that hope, but he never seemed to drop his fascination with an 
impending conflict with Europe over the most minute details. 
On innumerable occasions, Lincoln had had to tone down Seward's ultimatums to 
the British by editing his letters to foreign diplomats. 108 Even after Lincoln's tweaking, 
however, many of Seward's statements remained blatantly offensive. Seward's posturing 
attitude was one of the primary reasons that the British minister to the Union was 
frustrated with what he perceived as an overall Northern belief that she could "conquer 
the South with one hand and chastise Europe with the other."109 Worst of all, Seward was 
explosively impulsive and would sometimes fire off flammable rhetoric that he insisted 
be carbon-copied to the British leaders at the very moment it was mailed to the American 
ambassador. This made the American ambassador's job of softening Seward's message 
considerably more difficult and decreased the likelihood that the Union would long 
. . 110 remam m a one-enemy war. 
Lucky for the Union, the delays inherent in overseas communication caused the 
Trent affair to take three months to be resolved, a long enough period of time for tempers 
to cool and judgment to become unclouded. 111 At first Seward had been one of Wilkes's 
most solid supporters, but the long lapse in cordial communications, which had been 
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filled with ostentatious Canadian war preparations, gave Seward a chance to come to his 
senses and be persuaded that the Union had "no time to be diverted .. . into controversies 
with other powers, even if just causes for them could be found." 112 The fact that Seward 
had come around gave the British a rare opportunity to see in him the rational leader they 
so wanted to do business with. 113 
What encouraged the British was the quality of communication between Seward 
and Richard Lyons, the British minister to the Union. Although Seward refused to 
completely reveal his hand, the increase in amicable communication was remarkable. 
Lyons was satisfied by Seward's attitude of listening to British demands "seriously and 
with dignity," "without any manifestations of dissatisfaction." In an especially 
uncharacteristic moment, Seward "begged [Lyons] to be assured that [Seward] was very 
sensible of the friendly and conciliatory manner of British demands."114 
Seward was not a man to beg, and his change in attitude was so groundbreaking 
that Lyons had no qualms about lending Seward an unofficial copy of the list of British 
demands so that Seward could work to soften the American response to the letter's 
official announcement. Lyons felt so comfortable with Seward's behavior that, rather 
than demanding an answer immediately, he gave Seward "until tomorrow" to think the 
communications over. 115 In the end, Lyons' indulgences paid off, yielding both the 
surrender of the prisoners and an "[admission] that Reparation is due to Great Britain."116 
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After the Trent affair was resolved, British public opinion was as strongly behind 
the Union as it had once been opposed to it. The news of the conflict's resolution, 
announced between acts at the local British theaters, brought standing ovations. 117 But 
beyond winning the goodwill of the common man, the Trent affair had won British 
approval for the Northern Secretary of War as well, laying a foundation of trust for future 
negotiations.118 "I do not believe that Seward has any animosity to this country," wrote 
one prominent diplomat confidently. "It is all buncom" (sic). "At all events I am heart 
and soul a neutral ... What a fuss we have had about these two men." 119 And just like 
that, the blockade-created disaster was averted, contrary to all expectations. Not only did 
the Union and Great Britain not go to war over the issue, but their relationship was 
enhanced by it instead. 
Foiled Again 
After Seward's (temporary) diplomatic makeover, the tides of British favor turned 
noticeably Northem. 12° Charles Francis Adams, the Union minister to London, who could 
feel the wintry British opinion melting to spring, cheerfully branded the affair's outcome 
"rather opportune than otherwise."121 "Our victory is won on this side of the water," he 
fears and dampening their appetite for war. Third, Seward portrayed the Union's concession as a victory 
rather than as a defeat, claiming that the Union had only capitulated to the British demands because the 
British were acting upon "principles confessedly American" in their zeal to protect the rights of neutrals on 
the seas. 
In his addresses, Seward clung to the fact that Wilkes had acted ''without any instructions from the 
government." Although some people were upset by Seward's concession, most were well-satisfied with his 
response. "[Seward's behavior regarding the incident is] the most able thing he has ever written," said S.F. 
Dupont, rear admiral of the Northern navy. "If we were going to give in, it was as well done as it could be." 
117 Jenkins, I :239. McPherson, 391. 
118 Adams, I: 236. 
119 Graebner, 59. Adams, 1: 243. 
12° Charles P. Collup, Confederate Propaganda In Europe: 1861-1865 (Coral Gables, FL: 
University of Miami Press, 1969), 31. Owsley, 253-255. McPherson, 390. 
121 Adams, 1: 265. 
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declared. "The prospect of [British] interference with us is growing more and more 
remote."122 
Southerners also observed the change and were consumed by a "deep and burning 
.. . rage" mixed with hapless despair. 123 "The Trent affair has done us incalculable 
injury," one Confederate wrote home from London. Jefferson Davis was equally 
infuriated, exasperated because he correctly observed that the "neutral rights [granted by 
Britain] were alternately asserted and waived in such manner as to bear with great 
severity on [the South], while conferring signal advantages on [the North]." 124 
In this midst of this storm of emotions, Mason finally arrived in England in late 
January on the very vessel he had been expected to cruise up in months before. But in 
spite of the fact that the British had butted heads with the Union to ensure Mason's safe 
arrival, Mason observed with alarm that once he set foot on shore the British leaders 
treated him with a "studied discourtesy."125 He felt keenly what he did not yet know, that 
the British had decided he should "not to be received with honours or treated otherwise 
than as a distinguished gentlemen."126 John Russell, the British foreign secretary, met 
with him but refused to view his credentials, deeming the gesture "unnecessary [since 
their] relations were unofficial."127 Beyond that, Russell's attitude towards Mason was 
122 Ibid, 262. 
123 Russell, 263. 
124 Adams, 1: 265. Davis, The Rise and Fall, 2, 376. 
125 "The American Cause in England." The New York Times 13 Feb 1862. (from London 
correspondent) Proquest, via McKee Library http://library.southem.edu (accessed September 28, 2006). 
293. 
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cold, transparently unsympathetic, and very aloof. "His personal sympathies were not 
with us," Mason lamented, "his policy inaction."128 
Unfortunately for Mason, not only did he have to cope with the Trent affair's 
resulting Northern goodwill, but he also had little with which he could entice the British 
to change their attitude. Although his instructions from home were more sufficient than 
Yancey's had been, both his tactics for inciting British intervention and the success that 
they engendered bore a striking resemblance to his predecessor's policies. 129 Mason had 
tried to set his strategy apart by carrying across the seas recent and thorough statistics that 
"would prove completely the utter inefficacy of the blockade;" unfortunately, by the time 
he actually arrived, the statistics were hopelessly dated. 130 
Although Colonel Bunch did keep a steady trickle of blockade-busting 
information coming from his Charleston post, British opinion was by this time too strong 
in Northern favor for Bunch's statistics to make much of an impact. Although Lord 
Russell, the British foreign secretary, claimed that Bunch's letters would "induce [them] 
to consider the whole view of this question with a view to deciding what the course of the 
government should be," the British were inclined towards indifference. Instead of zeroing 
in on the blockade's flagrant violations, Russell focused on the "great exaggeration[s]" 
128 Ibid, 266. 
129 Ibid, 264. "The Obstructing of Southern Harbors." The New York Times 12 Feb 1862. 
Proquest, via McKee Library http://library.southem.edu (accessed September 28, 2006). 
129 "Lyons to Russell, Dispatch 30," Jan. I4, I862, British Eyes, I: 274-275. Mason's agenda 
largely resembled Yancey's except that Mason and his colleagues agreed to hold off on agitating for 
recognition, choosing to instead pound the blockade with ever-greater insistence. One new point that 
Mason raised was the injustice that the North exhibited in using large stones and sunken ships to increase 
the efficacy of her blockade. Mason's ploys were unsuccessful, however, and the resolution of the dispute 
actually increased the amicability of Northern-British relations. 
"The Civil War in America," Illustrated London News 39, no II21 (14 Dec. I861): 593, 
http://beck.library.emory.edu (accessed October 27, 2006). 
130 "Lyons to Russell, Dispatch 705," Nov. 25, 1861, British Eyes, I: 230. Adams, I: 268. The 
only available up-to-date evidence was that of Robert Bunch, but this evidence only accounted for 
Charleston's port, and even it began to dwindle towards the close of 1862 as the Union blockade grew more 
effective. 
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that the Southerners had used and accused them of cooking the books just as Britain's 
enemies done in previous wars. 131 
Rather than focusing on Bunch's statistics, Russell urged Parliament to consider 
the big picture when pondering a change of stance on the blockade: 
Has the Southern coast had a free and uninterrupted communication with 
Europe? Have your lordships heard that cotton has arrived in its usual 
quantities here, and that the manufacturers of Great Britain and France 
have arrived freely at the ports of the States which are now in a state of 
civil war? On the contrary, the intelligence we received shows that there 
has been no uninterrupted intercourse, but that great inconvenience has 
been suffered by the inhabitants of these Southern states, owing to the 
existence of that blockade, which is said to be defective. 132 
He reminded them that they had "entered into no engagement with that [Confederate] 
Government" thus far, and it would probably be best if matters stayed that way. 133 After 
all, he explained what the Trent affair had made increasingly obvious: that for Britain to 
take sides in the Civil War would have "been a misfortune and calamity for the world, 
and for the people of America especially."134 
As a result, Parliament decided to leave England's official stance on the blockade 
unaltered; after all, the blockade was by "now universally acknowledged as 
unobjectionable."135 Plus, they claimed, echoing the long-term North attitude, the issues 
of the Southern recognition and the Northern blockade were so tightly intertwined that 
131 "The Blockade in the House of Lords," The New York Times, 25 Mar 1862, Proquest, via 
McKee Library http://library.southem.edu (accessed September 28, 2006). For example, when the 
Southerners were counting the number of ships that had run the blockade, they also included in their 
statistics very tiny vessels of little consequence that could dart between ports by navigating creeks, streams, 
and tiny inlets within the North American continent. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid. Owsley, 242. Some historians like Brian Jenkins argue that the British preparations to 
invade Canada were part of what convinced Great Britain that starting another foreign war was a bad idea. 
Jenkins argues that, as they hastened to prepare for the conflict, the British were deterred from the prospect 
of war as they realized just how unprepared they were and what a huge investment of time and money 
another war would require. 
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one could not be approached without affecting the other. 136 After all, the North had as of 
late been overwhelmingly cooperative; to reward its good behavior with a sudden 
retraction of approval for its blockade would be the same as starting an "unproclaimed 
war."137 And the last thing the British wanted was war. 
Conclusion 
Although the British would continue to consider intervention as the war 
continued, after the years of 1861 to 1862 a beefed-up blockade would ensure that the 
British did not use the North's inadequate blockade to justify British intervention. 138 
Although the Northern blockade would never measure up to the requirements laid down 
in the Declaration of Paris (and what fantastical blockade ever could?), it would become 
sufficiently sturdy to please two of the three parties involved. 
Although the ramshackle Northern blockade could have become a Southern ticket 
to success, the delays of 1861 to 1862 caused a vital opportunity to be missed. 139 
Southern miscalculations were largely responsible for this enormous uh-oh. The 
Confederates were correct in believing that the British were driven by self-interest, but 
because they underestimated British foresight, the Confederates misdiagnosed the route 
that this interest would necessitate. The South was sure that the top British priority would 
be cotton; they had no idea that concerns about blockade precedents were even on the 
British radar. 
Although the North never wanted to have an ineffective blockade, the blockade's 
inadequacy accomplished more for the North than ten Declaration-of-Paris worthy 
136 Ibid, 270. 
137 1bid, 1: 271. "Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams," I. 
138 Parish, 398. 
139 Ibid. 
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blockades could have done because the situation decreased British interest in 
intervention. This instance provides a valuable lesson for historians. Nations at war are 
not perfect and cannot always tell what will be in their best interest in the long run, 
whether they will ride their weaknesses to victory or be thwarted by their strengths. 
A study of the development of precedents in this situation is also worthy of our 
consideration. As our world becomes increasingly global, the foreign relational tact 
exhibited by the British in the Civil War becomes an increasingly relevant model for all 
nations. Because Britain thoughtfully navigated (or rather, refused to navigate) dangerous 
diplomatic waters, they transformed what could have been a quagmire into an 
opportunity. Swift British thinking made it so that two nations could emerge victorious 
from the conflict: the North, who fought long and hard, and the British, who never fought 
at all. Today's diplomatically-savvy nations will do the same. 
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